Archive for the ‘Protectionism’ Category

Quick links

10 May 2012

My blogging has taken a back seat to my research recently. Here are some quick links that I wish I had more time to discuss:

Rose: Protectionism is acyclical

26 April 2012

Andrew Rose:

Almost everyone agrees that protectionism is countercyclical; tariffs, quotas, and the like grow during recessions. The abstract of Bagwell and Staiger (2003) begins “Empirical studies have repeatedly documented the countercyclical nature of trade barriers”; for support, they provide citations of eight papers which “all conclude that the average level of protection tends to rise in recessions and fall in booms.” Meanwhile, Costinot (2009) states: “One very robust finding of the empirical literature on trade protection is the positive impact of unemployment on the level of trade barriers. The same pattern can be observed across industries, among countries, and over time.” …

The sample is split into two in the scatter-plots to the right. Above, the data show a positive relationship between 1906 and 1942; high unemployment in the 1930s tends to coincide with high tariffs. This relationship is strikingly reversed in the graph below, which scatters tariffs against unemployment for the period between 1946 and 1982. Since World War Two, high American unemployment seems to coincide with low American tariffs; protectionism seems to be, if anything, cyclical…

The goal of my recent work has been to show that, at least since World War II, protectionism has not been countercyclic. While this runs counter to conventional wisdom, the evidence is reasonably strong; no obvious measure of protectionism seems to be consistently or strongly countercyclic.

An interesting question occurs: why is protectionism no longer countercyclic? Before World War I (and in contrast to more recent times), tariffs contributed greatly to the national treasury, there was no GATT, and the Gold Standard ruled. But it turns out that protectionist policies of countries with large and small budget deficits seem to react similarly to business cycles, as do those of countries inside and outside the GATT/WTO, those with fixed and floating exchange rates, small and large countries, and open and closed countries. If there has been a shift in the cyclicality of protectionism since WWII, it’s hard to be sure why.

Perhaps, just perhaps, the switch in the cyclicality of protectionism – if there has indeed been one – is a triumph of modern economics. After all, there is considerable and strong consensus among economists that protectionism is generally bad for welfare. And there is no doubt that economists are aware and actively involved in combating countercyclic protectionism; this was especially visible during the Great Recession, which saw the successful launch of Global Trade Alert in June 2009. If – and it’s a big if – the efforts of the economic profession are part of the reason that protectionism is no longer countercyclic, then the profession deserves a collective pat on the back. But in that case the profession should also consider setting its sights higher. If economists have helped reduce the cyclicality of protectionism, then perhaps they should focus on actually reducing protectionism.

The structure of US trade barriers in two numbers

17 April 2012

US apparel and footwear imports as a percentage of total US imports: 5%

US apparel and footwear import duties as a percentage of total US import duties: 40%

From the American Apparel and Footwear Association, who chose to present those two numbers using two pie charts.

US abandons zeroing (for now?)

7 February 2012

I’m seeing a lot of news about the US federal government dropping its practice of zeroing in calculating antidumping duties. The WTO news item is uninformative. I don’t have time this week to follow the latest developments, so I’ll just drop links:

FT:

The US has reached deals with the European Union and Japan to drop a contentious practice in its anti-dumping calculations known as “zeroing”, ending a longstanding international trade dispute in order to prevent retaliation against American products. The agreements, signed in Geneva, will close the books on a fight that began in 2003 when the EU first filed a case against the US at the World Trade Organisation.

USTR press release:

After the WTO found that the United States had not brought its antidumping methodologies into compliance, the EU and Japan requested authorization to impose hundreds of millions of dollars of trade retaliation. Had these agreements not been reached today, substantial volumes of U.S. exports could have been closed out of markets in the EU and Japan, resulting in job loss for U.S. workers and financial loss for U.S. farms and businesses…

Under the agreements signed today, the United States will complete the process – which began in December 2010 – of ending the zeroing practices found in these disputes to be inconsistent with WTO rules. In return, the EU and Japan will drop their claims for trade retaliation.

Politics-oriented coverage from The Hill includes this detail: “the Obama administration said it will try to negotiate a future deal at the WTO to permit the practice.” Here’s Scott Lincicome on the news.

Pakistan grants India MFN status

8 November 2011

Pakistan has granted MFN status to India (with a list of excepted products). This accelerates liberalization between the two countries that had made some progress with the South Asian FTA (SAFTA). India granted Pakistan MFN status back in 1995. Here’s a State Bank of Pakistan research bulletin arguing for granting India MFN. Here’s a World Bank book on The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan-India Trade, which includes this paragraph:

In fact, the evidence on informal trade indicates that Pakistan has already granted something close to de facto MFN status to India. Traders exploit market arbitrage and the poor enforcement of antismuggling measures to import banned Indian products into Pakistan, hence with the change in the trade regime there could be additional revenues for the government for items that are likely to switch from the informal trade to formal trade.

How did Pakistan not grant India MFN status while being a WTO member since its inception in 1995? While MFN status has been relegated to “least favored nation” status in many circumstances, it seems that it still means something in this part of the world.

Creative protectionism: Argentina requires firm-level balanced trade

14 October 2011

The Economist describes some very unusual trade policies implemented by Argentina:

Argentine manufacturers have been booming ever since the 2001 crash. Over most of that period, a cheap peso has ensured their competitiveness. But since 2005 inflation has been in double digits. As the trade surplus has dwindled, Cristina Fernández, the president, has beefed up her industrial policy. According to Global Trade Alert, a database of restrictions on international commerce, Argentina now imposes more trade limitations deemed “harmful” than any country save Russia…

On the import side, Argentina cannot raise tariffs on its own because it belongs to the Mercosur customs union. So it is resorting to informal tools. Its main method is “non-automatic licensing”, a tactic recognised by the World Trade Organisation that lets countries delay imports for 60 days.

Argentina has made no pretence of honouring that time period. In January it expanded the list of products requiring licences from 400 to 600. It was a limit on phone imports that led Research in Motion to hire Brightstar to make BlackBerrys in Argentina (tax incentives then led the firm to Tierra del Fuego). Other affected goods include toys, pharmaceutical ingredients, tyres, fabrics, leather and farm machinery. On September 15th Argentina blocked imports of books, and over 1m piled up at the borders. Imports of Harley-Davidson motorcycles are frozen until 2012.

For firms that refuse to (or cannot) move production to Argentina, the government offers another option: deals to export goods worth at least as much as a company’s imports. In January customs officials stopped letting Nordenwagen import Porsches. Its cars languished in port for three months before the firm succumbed to a deal. Since its owners also possess Pulenta Estate, a vineyard, they agreed to launch a new line of mass-market wines for export, erasing the family’s trade deficit. They are also considering canning fruits. “It’s not the same margins as fine wines, but it takes time and investment. We’re trying to make it profitable,” says Eduardo Pulenta, the company’s export manager. “We’ll keep working to import cars. That’s what we know how to do.”

Wow.

The policy was adopted in March. Here’s the Global Trade Alert entry from July, which relies on Spanish-language news stories. Here’s an English-language story from April. Thanks to Bernardo Astarloa, who passed along this Spanish-language story in Argentina’s La Nación. It details the products being exported by various car manufacturers in exchange for importing autos into Argentina:

  • Porsche: wine and olive oil
  • Hyundai: peanuts and soy biofuels
  • BMW: rice and leather upholstery
  • Alfa Romero: biofuel
  • Kia: auto parts, plastics, refrigerators
  • Mitsubishi: mineral water, pet food, peanuts
  • Nissan: biofuels and soy

An Argentinian commenter at the Economist post argues that these policies don’t add up to much, but their novelty is certainly notable!

Most protectionist post-war action?

12 August 2011

Fred Bergsten says:

“China has intervened massively in the foreign exchange markets for at least five years, buying at least $1 billion every day to keep the dollar strong and its own renminbi weak… This is by far the largest protectionist measure adopted by any country since the Second World War — and probably in all of history.”

All of history? What about periods of autarky?

What’s the effective rate of protection?

5 August 2011

Tariffs on intermediate inputs vs final goods:

Today I received some tax saving wisdom from a taxi driver in Ukraine. He told me that people who import cars to Ukraine sometimes cut the car in two separate pieces and carry it through the customs this way. By doing this, they save a fortune on import tax. A car carried in two pieces is seen as spare parts and therefore is taxed at a much lower rate than a normal car.

cars-cut-in-half-for-lower-import-tax

cars-cut-in-half-for-lower-import-tax-2

When in Ukraine, the car is welded back into one piece. After that, it’s usually sold locally at a good price. I looked through forums and apparently this is a common practise in developing countries, particularly in post-Soviet states such as Ukraine.

Via MR.

“Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data”

21 July 2011

Ralph Ossa:

I propose a flexible framework for the quantitative analysis of unilateral and multilateral trade policy. It is based on a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model of international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980), and special interest politics as in Grossman and Helpman (1994). By combining these elements, it takes a unified view of trade policy which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. Specifically, it features import tariffs which serve to manipulate the terms-of-trade, shift profits away from other countries, and channel profits towards politically influential industries…

With regard to multilateral trade policy, I find that the world trade war tariffs vary widely across industries, countries, and trading partners and average 63 percent. This is roughly in line with the noncooperative tariffs observed following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. They would substantially decrease real income in all countries with the average loss amounting to 4.1 percent. I also find that tariff changes which correspond to the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity can be characterized by a simple formula which is easy to implement in practice. While this formula identifies a number of industries in which there is still scope for future reciprocal trade negotiations, it also suggests that the overall gains from such negotiations would be quite small…

I believe that this is the first quantitative framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I also believe that this is the first study which provides estimates of optimal and noncooperative tariffs at the industry level for the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations…

My application focuses on 7 regions and 26 manufacturing industries in the year 2005. The regions are Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, the US, and a residual Rest of the World and are chosen to comprise the main players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations.

US cotton subsidies causing turmoil

22 June 2011

The US House has passed legislation that threatens its WTO-approved agreement with Brazil on cotton subsidies:

Questions are being raised about the future of the hard-won US-Brazil cotton agreement, thanks to last week’s vote in the US House of Representatives to end payments to the Brazil Cotton Institute. In a 223-197 vote, members passed an amendment to the Agricultural Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2012 that, if enacted into law, would violate the terms of the 2010 WTO US-Upland Cotton agreement between the two countries (see Bridges Weekly, 8 June 2011).

The US$147.3 million annual payments were part of an agreement between the two countries that meant to hold Brazil back from imposing US$830 million in WTO-authorised countermeasures. The agreement came after a protracted WTO dispute that deemed various aspects of the US cotton subsidy regime as illegal.

The bill’s sponsor would like to see cuts to US agricultural subsidies, but those aren’t in the legislation:

“I’m pleased that a bipartisan group of Members agreed with me that supporting Brazil’s cotton industry with taxpayer dollars is wasteful and unnecessary. But the bill as a whole still irresponsibly overlooks other commonsense cuts such as the billions of dollars in outdated farm subsidies going to very few large agribusinesses. We cannot afford to continue spending carelessly and cutting recklessly, especially in this tough economy.”

In ongoing discussions about a mini-package for the WTO’s December ministerial meeting, the US ambassador to the WTO is pointing fingers at China for its cotton subsidies.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 3,068 other followers