Author Archives: jdingel

NAFTA is nearly completed

The WaPo ran a Sunday cover story on NAFTA’s impact on Mexico as it takes full effect:

As NAFTA’s final provisions take effect next year, tying Mexico’s fortunes more tightly to world markets, how will its economy adjust? And how will the latest wave of trade liberalization alter the calculations for millions of Mexicans wanting to stay home, but constantly feeling the tug of the north?…

NAFTA did bring Mexico foreign investment. Jobs at its maquiladoras — export factories set up in the 1960s, mostly near the border — more than doubled from 540,000 to 1.13 million between 1993 and 2004. But in other factories, employment has slipped and average wages have dropped by 5 percent.

Economists emphasize that any assessment of NAFTA must include the financial crisis that savaged Mexico in 1994 and 1995, sowing unemployment. Some assert that without NAFTA and the exports it fueled, Mexico’s recovery would have been slower. Many also say that Mexico’s government squandered opportunities for growth by failing to improve highways and ports, and by leaving unchecked the monopoly power of the national telephone company, which has kept rates for Internet access and other telecommunication services high, discouraging new ventures…

“For people who can grow huge scale for export, NAFTA has been good,” he said. “For people like us, it’s been a bloodbath.”…

Feed amounts to nearly 60 percent of the cost of raising a chicken. For the American poultry industry, the cost has been held down, historically, by subsidies for corn production. In 2005, American cropland for corn received a range of subsidies worth more than $10 billion, according to a Washington Post analysis of data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Labor, where Mexico has an advantage, makes up only about 5 percent of production costs.

Want $25k?

Know anything about Bangladeshi development?

Propose an innovative and practical idea that would improve the lives of low- and middle- income people of Bangladesh (everyone except the top-third of the population in terms of annual income). Proposals will be judged by four Harvard University faculty members, in consultation with scholars familiar with Bangladesh.

This global contest is open to any individual in the world. Any compelling essay that establishes a way to improve the lives of low- and middle-income people in Bangladesh is acceptable for submission. The essays will be rated giving equal weights to a) innovative nature of the idea; b) clarity and cogency of argument and writing; c) ease and practicality of implementation; and d) the size of impact.

The author of the winning essay will be awarded the Anwarul Quadir Prize, USD $25,000.

Entries due June 30. Full info.

Open thread

It’s a new year – care to suggest a resolution that I should adopt for Trade Diversion? If you’ve got thoughts about topics I should (or shouldn’t cover) or other suggestions for the blog, please leave a comment or email me. Thanks!

Assessing competitive liberalization

Simon Evenett & Michael Meier (pdf):

When the Bush Administration took office in January 2001 the U.S. executive branch had been without trade negotiating authority from Congress for six years. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the newly appointed U.S. trade officials put a high priority on being granted this authority and perhaps felt that they needed a compelling narrative to explain why that authority should be granted and how it would be subsequently used. Competitive Liberalization was adopted as the credo of the Bush Administration’s trade officials…

There is no doubt that U.S. trade negotiators have been very active since 2001… At least 18 Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, a pre-cursor to negotiations for a free trade agreement, have been signed. The Doha Round was launched and U.S. officials have contributed to ongoing regional initiatives such as APEC and the FTAA. Some might argue that these activities have restored the United States’ central role in the world trading system and this is praise enough. However, is this the right metric to judge Competitive Liberalization? After all, has the implementation of this policy fulfilled the goals articulated for it at the beginning of the Bush Administration? This question is all the more important as Competitive Liberalization represented an explicit break from the United States almost exclusive pursuit of multilateralism.

We argued that a number of factors have limited the effectiveness of the policy of Competitive Liberalization often from the start, including: the internal divisions among U.S. legislators and among the executive branch over the priorities for U.S. trade policy; the associated tendency to load more and more conditions on U.S. trading partners before and during negotiations on free trade agreements; the effect of pre-existing U.S. unilateral preference schemes; and the options available to trading partners to bolster foreign direct investment other than signing free trade agreements with the United States. These constraints, plus concerns about the coherence of the logic underlying Competitive Liberalization and the incentives created by some aspects of this policy, lead us to conclude that the current U.S. trade policy is almost certain to fall well short of its stated goals.

Over the longer term, U.S. officials and trade policy experts may want to reflect on the strength of the supposedly mutually reinforcing aspects of negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. For if multilateralism and leading regional trade initiatives remain stalled, then Competitive Liberalization may amount to little more than bilateral opportunism masquerading as high principle.

How big is China’s trade surplus?

Brad Setser:

Michael Spence has a Nobel prize in economics, a series of very prestigious academic appointments, friends on the Harvard faculty and access to the opinion page of the Wall Street Journal.

I, obviously, don’t have comparable qualifications — or comparable access to the Wall Street Journal’s oped page.

But I do try to follow the data coming out of China closely. I probably shouldn’t say this, but it sure seemed to me that Dr. Spence got a few key facts wrong in his Wall Street Journal oped…

If you just look at China’s trade surplus (BoP basis), it works out to around 5.5% in 2005 and probably 6.5-7% of China’s GDP in 2006 — numbers comparable to the US trade deficit. Spence’s graph shows China’s trade surplus through 2004. That seems a bit misleading to me: China’s trade surplus ballooned in 2005 and 2006, just when the graph ends. Spence’s argument worked through 2004. It no longer does.

Spence’s side of the debate is behind the WSJ‘s firewall.

Fair trade fakers

National Post:

According to a CBC report published this week, TransFair Canada, the most prominent Canadian fair-trade monitor, is joining with fair-trade retailers to raise concerns about unethical rivals who are horning in on the label without, as it were, walking the walk. Anybody can slap a sticker reading “fair trade” onto a bag of coffee, and apparently it happens rather a lot. At least one coffee shop is pressing Ottawa to regulate fair trade certification.

State-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights Policy

Daron Acemoglu & Ufuk Akcigit:

What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions… We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the “trickle-down” effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less advanced than this threshold. [emphasis added]

Given the credentials of the authors, I’m sure the theoretical work is outstanding (non-gated version here). But state-dependent IPR protection strikes me as implausible in practice. How adept are government bureaucrats at identifying technological leaders and the size of their lead? How resistant are they to regulatory capture?

The global economy’s absorption of the Taiwanese earthquake

Barry Lynn’s controversial view of the global supply chain:

“The hyperspecialized and hyper-rigid production system that is emerging is, if we are honest, the natural outcome of what happens when globalization and outsourcing are combined with an entire lack of regulation by governments,” writes Lynn. “When the borders of the nation and the borders of the firm are both simultaneously ripped open, the result, in industry after industry, is a chain reaction that results very quickly in a single highly networked and highly specialized system of production.”

In Lynn’s view, being highly networked and specialized creates dangerous new vulnerabilities. As an example of what can go wrong, Lynn cites an earthquake that occurred in Taiwan in September 1999. Taiwan is the world’s No. 1 source of made-to-order advanced semiconductors — the microchips that are the brains of iPods, DVD players, computer graphics cards, cellphones and countless other electronic devices. Although the handful of factories that manufacture such chips were not seriously damaged by the quake, power and transportation systems in Taiwan were severely disrupted for a week. The ripple effect of that turned out to be an economic tsunami of sorts for the global high-tech economy.

Shortly after the Taiwan earthquake, some observers feared a global economic crash was beginning. That didn’t happen. But a key lesson should have been learned. There was no backup plan. There were no other factories that could produce those chips, in the short term. A bigger earthquake, one that might reduce to rubble the science park where Taiwan’s top chip plants are located, could have had devastating consequences.

Tuesday’s test of his theory:

An earthquake in southern Taiwan on Tuesday night damaged an undersea optic cable, causing serious disruptions to international phone lines and Internet connections in Korea, Taiwan, China, Japan and Southeast Asia…

Taiwan was the worst affected. Chunghwa Telecom said 60 percent of the phone lines to the U.S. were cut off and 98 percent of communication linking Taiwan with Malaysia and Singapore suffered disruptions. The company forecast it will take two to three weeks for the nation to completely repair the damaged cables. The earthquake also disrupted 1,400 phone lines and 84 international phone lines of Japanese telecom firm NTT, making it impossible to call Southeast Asia from Japan.

The outcome in India:

India’s software and BPO industries recovered some of their connectivity to the US and Europe after undersea fibre optic providers offered an alternative to the Pacific route, which was disrupted due to a quake on Tuesday… Several IT and BPO companies faced a disruption in operations. However, they did not experience a breakdown since they have roped in multiple bandwidth providers and built up a redundancy in operations for such an eventuality. TCS could not confirm that it faced any downtime for any of its operations.

China:

Telecommunications disruptions caused by Tuesday’s earthquake in south Taiwan have stopped foreign trade companies along coastal areas in the Chinese mainland in their tracks. Though the Ministry of Information Industry have taken measures and tried to repair the broken-down, the international access on the internet are still jammed.

Elsewhere:

Companies in the region for the most part said they found ways to work around Tuesday’s earthquake. Among the best off were companies that buy service from telecom carriers with redundant cables or backup satellite systems for these types of disasters. Stock markets were unfazed: In Tokyo, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average closed up 0.31% at 17,223.15 points, while Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index rose 2.1% to 19,725.73, a record high…

[S]ome businesses found themselves out of touch with critical operations and customers. For example, Hong Kong-based Kingstar Shipping, which manages 10 ships around the region, was unable to reach clients in Japan or Korea and some in Singapore, according to KL Tam, managing director. “We have been trying other ways to communicate — but nothing much works,” he said. Most of Kingstar’s ships today have cargo now, but “if this continued for several days, our operations overseas would essentially stop,” he said…

Executives at some telecom companies say yesterday’s problems indicated they may need to beef up their backup systems even more. “Our plan had been in place for a long time,” said Maki Sato, a KDDI spokeswoman. “But we are now studying whether it should be strengthened.”

The global economy has the ability to absorb mild-sized hiccups to such a degree that the costly creation of global redundancy may not be necessary [a position analogous to this book’s case against overreaction in the security arena]. That’s Chunghwa Telecom Co’s position. But a truly devastating scenario may be reasonably imagined. I expect to see more cost-benefit analysis on this topic soon.

Update: Two weeks later, how is the recovery?