Category Archives: Protectionism

"The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?"

Barry Eichengreen and Doug Irwin look at the drivers of Depression-era protectionism:

The Great Depression was marked by protectionist trade policies and the breakdown of the multilateral trading system. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, national policies toward the exchange rate help explain changes in trade policy. This suggests that trade protection in the 1930s was less an instance of special interest politics run amok than second-best macroeconomic policy management when monetary and fiscal policies were constrained.

Trade policy and the crisis: "The fateful allure of protectionism"

The CEPR & World Bank have a new book on trade policy and the crisis edited by Simon Evenett, Bernard Hoekman, and Olivier Cattaneo.

They are mostly warning that countries should guard against protectionism, though we haven’t seen any serious outbreak yet:

Some countries have utilized the ‘policy space’ they have to raise tariffs, but projections – based on past behaviour – are that any such increases are likely to remain limited: In a sector that in the 1970s and 1980s became a bastion of protectionism, textiles and apparel, policy remains very open. Another illustration of the relevance of WTO rules is that countries that are not members are among those that have made the most intensive use of measures to restrict trade and/or investment – e.g., Algeria, Russia.

Whether more positive actions – complete the Doha round, look at climate change initiatives, fund trade policy monitoring efforts, etc – are politically feasible remains to be seen.

Trade policy and the crisis: “The fateful allure of protectionism”

The CEPR & World Bank have a new book on trade policy and the crisis edited by Simon Evenett, Bernard Hoekman, and Olivier Cattaneo.

They are mostly warning that countries should guard against protectionism, though we haven’t seen any serious outbreak yet:

Some countries have utilized the ‘policy space’ they have to raise tariffs, but projections – based on past behaviour – are that any such increases are likely to remain limited: In a sector that in the 1970s and 1980s became a bastion of protectionism, textiles and apparel, policy remains very open. Another illustration of the relevance of WTO rules is that countries that are not members are among those that have made the most intensive use of measures to restrict trade and/or investment – e.g., Algeria, Russia.

Whether more positive actions – complete the Doha round, look at climate change initiatives, fund trade policy monitoring efforts, etc – are politically feasible remains to be seen.

Monitoring protectionism with Global Trade Alert

It’s World Trade Week in the UK. Unfortunately, I flew Heathrow to JFK yesterday, so I was unable to attend. At yesterday’s conference, Peter Mandelson introduced and Simon Evenett explained a new watchdog website devoted to monitoring protectionism – Global Trade Alert. Reuters reports:

British Business Secretary Peter Mandelson said the Global Trade Alert site would act as a watchdog to deter governments from protectionist measures that he warned would only make the recession “longer and more painful.”

“Everyone is watching everyone else and there is a lot to be said for peer pressure,” he said. “(The) trading system faces a huge crisis of demand and of credit, but the real long-term risk to its health lies in protectionism.”…

The website, http://www.globaltradealert.org, will be co-funded by the British government and run by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, a London-based thinktank. About 700 researchers working mainly in European universities will gather evidence.

It’ll be interesting to see how the UK government monitors itself. As for those 700 researchers, that’s the total number of economists affiliated with CEPR. I don’t think they’ve all been reassigned to Global Trade Alert. 🙂

"What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade"

An entire paper estimating cross-country regressions with the estimated Grossman and Helpman (1994) weight on welfare as the dependent variable? I’m skeptical, even if the empirical results are plausible (governments are more concerned with welfare in the presence of more informed voters and more checks and balances, less so when media advertising and competitive elections prioritize special interest money).

  • The authors note that their estimates of the “government’s concern for general welfare” parameter are reasonable and thus differ significantly from five previous papers empirically estimating the Grossman-Helpman model. Why do they obtain different results?
  • The OECD countries in the sample largely make trade policy in multilateral negotiations, not a unilateral vacuum, so I am skeptical that the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model even applies.
  • If the authors hadn’t excluded economies without an elected legislature from the sample, how would they have handled Hong Kong’s estimated welfare concern of infinity? (Concern for welfare is inversely related to the tariff level, and Hong Kong’s tariffs are zero.)

“What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade”

An entire paper estimating cross-country regressions with the estimated Grossman and Helpman (1994) weight on welfare as the dependent variable? I’m skeptical, even if the empirical results are plausible (governments are more concerned with welfare in the presence of more informed voters and more checks and balances, less so when media advertising and competitive elections prioritize special interest money).

  • The authors note that their estimates of the “government’s concern for general welfare” parameter are reasonable and thus differ significantly from five previous papers empirically estimating the Grossman-Helpman model. Why do they obtain different results?
  • The OECD countries in the sample largely make trade policy in multilateral negotiations, not a unilateral vacuum, so I am skeptical that the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model even applies.
  • If the authors hadn’t excluded economies without an elected legislature from the sample, how would they have handled Hong Kong’s estimated welfare concern of infinity? (Concern for welfare is inversely related to the tariff level, and Hong Kong’s tariffs are zero.)

Trade remedy usage is up

Chad Bown is keeping an eye on global trends in the use of trade remedies.

Compared to the same time period in 2008, the first quarter of 2009 saw an 18.8% increase in initiated investigations in which domestic industries request the imposition of new import restrictions under trade remedy laws. While the list of new investigations is dominated by India and Argentina, other G-20 members that also initiated at least one new investigation during the first quarter of 2009 include Australia, Canada, China, the European Union and its member states, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and the United States. China`s exporters were the dominant target for these new investigations that may result in import restrictions, facing over two thirds of the new investigations.

Political economy, MFN, and industrial structure

Robert Lawrence:

Although we call the big three automobile companies, they have basically specialized in building trucks…

But another is that the profit margins have been much higher on trucks and vans because the US protects its domestic market with a twenty-five percent tariff. By contrast, the import tariff on regular automobiles is just 2.5 percent…

In 1962, when implementing the European Common Market, the Community denied access to US chicken producers. In response after being unable to resolve the issue diplomatically, the US responded with retaliatory tariffs that included a twenty five percent tariffs on trucks that was aimed at the German Volkswagen Combi-Bus that was enjoying brisk sales in the US. 

Since the trade (GATT) rules required that retaliation be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, the tariffs were levied on all truck-type vehicles imported from all countries and have never been removed. Over time, the Germans stopped building these vehicles and today the tariffs are mainly paid on trucks coming from Asia. The tariffs have bred bad habits, steering Detroit away from building high-quality automobiles towards trucks and truck like cars that have suddenly fallen into disfavor.

If congress wants an explanation for why the big three have been so uncompetitive it should look first at the disguised largess it has been providing them with for years. It has taken a long time — nearly 47 years —  but it seems that eventually the chickens have finally come home to roost.

I think the blame lies with Congress, but I could see them trying to pass the blame to the GATT’s MFN clause.