Africa's image

William Easterly writes in the LA Times:

Today, as I sip my Rwandan gourmet coffee and wear my Nigerian shirt here in New York, and as European men eat fresh Ghanaian pineapple for breakfast and bring Kenyan flowers home to their wives, I wonder what it will take for Western consumers to learn even more about the products of self-sufficient, hardworking, dignified Africans. Perhaps they should spend less time consuming Africa disaster stereotypes from television and Vanity Fair.

Last summer, Shreya Shah wrote:

With better media coverage, the United States and the world would realize that there is more to Africa than death, disease, disaster, and despair. The promotion and visibility of a brighter Africa within society-at-large will play a significant role in creating cultural pride, encourage good business practice and sound investment in African businesses.

Africa's image

William Easterly writes in the LA Times:

Today, as I sip my Rwandan gourmet coffee and wear my Nigerian shirt here in New York, and as European men eat fresh Ghanaian pineapple for breakfast and bring Kenyan flowers home to their wives, I wonder what it will take for Western consumers to learn even more about the products of self-sufficient, hardworking, dignified Africans. Perhaps they should spend less time consuming Africa disaster stereotypes from television and Vanity Fair.

Last summer, Shreya Shah wrote:

With better media coverage, the United States and the world would realize that there is more to Africa than death, disease, disaster, and despair. The promotion and visibility of a brighter Africa within society-at-large will play a significant role in creating cultural pride, encourage good business practice and sound investment in African businesses.

Africa’s image

William Easterly writes in the LA Times:

Today, as I sip my Rwandan gourmet coffee and wear my Nigerian shirt here in New York, and as European men eat fresh Ghanaian pineapple for breakfast and bring Kenyan flowers home to their wives, I wonder what it will take for Western consumers to learn even more about the products of self-sufficient, hardworking, dignified Africans. Perhaps they should spend less time consuming Africa disaster stereotypes from television and Vanity Fair.

Last summer, Shreya Shah wrote:

With better media coverage, the United States and the world would realize that there is more to Africa than death, disease, disaster, and despair. The promotion and visibility of a brighter Africa within society-at-large will play a significant role in creating cultural pride, encourage good business practice and sound investment in African businesses.

Zimbabwe's nightmare

Zimbabwe is a disaster:

As the police and a pro-government youth militia swept into shops and factories, threatening arrest and worse unless prices were rolled back, staple foods vanished from store shelves and some merchants reported huge losses. News reports said that some shopkeepers who had refused to lower prices had been beaten by the youth militia, known as the Green Bombers for the color of their fatigues.

In interviews, merchants said that crowds of people were following the police and militia from shop to shop to buy goods at the government-ordered prices.

I remember when Zimbabwe’s annual inflation was over 1,000 percent. It’s now in excess of 10,000.

Zimbabwe's nightmare

Zimbabwe is a disaster:

As the police and a pro-government youth militia swept into shops and factories, threatening arrest and worse unless prices were rolled back, staple foods vanished from store shelves and some merchants reported huge losses. News reports said that some shopkeepers who had refused to lower prices had been beaten by the youth militia, known as the Green Bombers for the color of their fatigues.

In interviews, merchants said that crowds of people were following the police and militia from shop to shop to buy goods at the government-ordered prices.

I remember when Zimbabwe’s annual inflation was over 1,000 percent. It’s now in excess of 10,000.

Zimbabwe’s nightmare

Zimbabwe is a disaster:

As the police and a pro-government youth militia swept into shops and factories, threatening arrest and worse unless prices were rolled back, staple foods vanished from store shelves and some merchants reported huge losses. News reports said that some shopkeepers who had refused to lower prices had been beaten by the youth militia, known as the Green Bombers for the color of their fatigues.

In interviews, merchants said that crowds of people were following the police and militia from shop to shop to buy goods at the government-ordered prices.

I remember when Zimbabwe’s annual inflation was over 1,000 percent. It’s now in excess of 10,000.

Why does economics blogging matter?

Richard Baldwin on the gap between economic theory and practice:

In the 1980s, brilliant young economists like Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, Jeff Sachs and Joe Stiglitz felt obliged to write Brookings or Economic Policy articles, to sit on government panels, to write policy reports, and to send Op-Ed pieces to the Financial Times. At the time, it was part of the definition of a being a leading scholar. It helped you get tenure at Harvard. It also bridged the gap between cutting-edge research and the public debate on trade policy, exchange rates, current account dynamics, etc.

Today’s brilliant young economists are much less interested in participating in the public debate in these ways. I have no empirical evidence to back up this opinion, but I think it is shared by many economists involved in economic policy issues and I had first-hand experience of it during my five years as a Managing Editor of Economic Policy. Young people need publications in good anonymously-reviewed journals; everything else is a luxury…

In the top economic journals, “Policy Implication” sections have fallen out of favour. Including such conjectures in a manuscript is unlikely to raise the probability of publication. Given the natural conservatism of the leading economic journals, there is probably no hope that the journals themselves will encourage authors to draw out the policy implications of their work. In any case, there is a widespread perception that policy analysis is not really the business of scientists. For example, the NBER Working Papers explicitly prohibit policy recommendations. The discussion of research results that does not take place in the journals has spilled over into cyberspace…

One can spend some pleasant hours browsing the various blogs – and even learn a lot from the big blogs, like “Economist’s View”, “New Economist”, ”Marginal Revolution”, and the sites of Brad DeLong, Greg Mankiw, and Nouriel Roubini. But this is not the profession’s response to the Discussion Sections of medical journals. It is more like the collegial coffee-room discussions we used to have when there was time for such things.

Blogs may be too informal to serve as policy discussion sections, but I love hanging out in the coffee room…

Misleading metaphors

Chang:

In pushing for free-market policies that make life more difficult for poor countries, the bad samaritans frequently deploy the rhetoric of the “level playing field.” They argue that developing countries should not be allowed to use extra policy tools for protection, subsidies and regulation, as these constitute unfair competition. Who can disagree?

Well, we all should, if we want to build an international system that promotes economic development. A level playing field leads to unfair competition when the players are unequal. Most sports have strict separation by age and gender, while boxing, wrestling and weightlifting have weight classes, which are often divided very finely. How is it that we think a bout between people with more than a couple of kilos’ weight difference is unfair, and yet we accept that the US and Honduras should compete economically on equal terms?

Sports contests are zero-sum games; economic exchanges are not. I would be surprised to read a sports metaphor that provided more economic insight than confusion. Metaphors like competitiveness are dangerous. Economists like Chang shouldn’t use rhetoric that compares economies and athletes, and free-marketers should be chastised for introducing ‘level playing field’ metaphors too.

The IMF and WB in Africa

Ha-Joon Chang has a new book promoting protectionism, titled Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. In an article in this month’s issue of Prospect magazine (hat tip to Pablo), he writes:

As for Africa, its per capita income grew relatively slowly even in the 1960s and the 1970s (1-2 per cent a year). But since the 1980s, the region has seen a fall in living standards. There are, of course, many reasons for this failure, but it is nonetheless a damning indictment of the neoliberal orthodoxy, because most of the African economies have been practically run by the IMF and the World Bank over the past quarter of a century.

While I agree that the IMF and the World Bank haven’t done a great job, I think it’s wrong to portray them as the caretakers of Africa and the institutions responsible for its disappointing growth rates. They’ve never had that much power, and I’ve never seen another academic suggest it. Research on African economic performance has focused on institutions and geography. As Paul Collier summarizes (pdf):

Africa’s growth failure has attracted competing explanations. During the 1980s the World Bank diagnosed the problem as inappropriate economic policies, Berg (1981) offering the
first clear statement of this position. Bates (1981) was the first to explain these dysfunctional policy choices in terms of the interests of powerful groups, notably the taxation of export agriculture. During the 1990s the limited response to reform induced a broader search for explanations (Collier and Gunning, 1999, 1999a). Recently three further explanations have gained currency: institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001), leadership (Jones and Olken, 2005), and geography (Sachs, 2003).

Is there any academic research that concurs with Chang in blaming the IMF and World Bank for Africa’s disappointing growth?

Political economy of trade policy: Irrational voters & protection for sale

The thesis of Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter, in the briefest terms and paraphrasing Mencken, is that the common people know what they want, and democracy gives it to them good and hard. As Caplan explains it, in the realm of trade policy, steel tariffs are imposed not because clever lobbyists fight to reap concentrated benefits at the (dispersed) expense of the general public, but because average people (and the median voter) like steel tariffs. That’s why the president holds a press conference to announce new protectionism, rather than quietly erecting barriers that favor special interests.

Caplan’s story is very different from the most popular political economy model of trade policy — Grossman & Helpman’s “Protection for Sale.” That model abstracts from much of the political process and applies contract theory (see “Protection for Sale Made Easy“). In short, the lobbies present the government with contribution schedules that induce the government to do what the lobbies want the government to do. The government’s objective function is some linear combination of social welfare and political contributions. The result of lobbying is that governments care too much about producer profits and thus impose tariffs. The model’s predictions are borne out empirically to some degree. Moreover, investigations also find a positive correlation between the size of contributions and tariff levels.

So which story better explains reality? Do lobbies or public opinion trigger protectionism? Are there data that would allow us to distinguish between the two hypotheses, given that they both predict protection?

A synthesis of the two would be Jagdish Bhagwati’s distinction between downstream directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities – rent-seeking taking place in response to an existing distortion, such as lobbying for a quota allocation – and upstream DUP activities that aim to create distortions. The broad contours of trade policy – a country’s aggregate openness – may be determined by public opinion or the median voter, while the specific manifestations of protection are sufficiently insulated from public perception that they are largely determined by an inside-the-Beltway lobbying process.

Empirically testing this suggested synthesis would be difficult, however. If firms lobby rationally and know that they are constrained by public opinion, then we should expect them to largely engage downstream DUP activities, foregoing upstream DUP activities rendered impotent by the democratic process. But classifying real-world lobbying activities as upstream or downstream may be impossible, making the test hopeless.

Other suggestions for tackling this topic?