An Islamic FTA?

A story from last week:

Muslim countries have been urged to set up an Islamic common market as a way of boosting trade and development. The call came at the end of a three-day World Islamic Economic Forum held under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The forum in Kuala Lumpur said the OIC’s 57 nations could gain economic clout internationally by signing an Islamic free trade agreement. At present, OIC countries’ collective GDP is less than 5% of the world total. Trading between OIC countries is worth about $800bn (£456bn) – no more than 7% of global trade as a whole. [BBC]

I don’t have enough time to post an in-depth examination of the proposal (as I’ve already procrastinated sufficiently on my grad school applications), but here are a few thoughts.

Why this agreement would be undesirable –

– As with all discriminatory trade, there’d be some trade diversion. Currently, trade within the bloc amounts to 13 percent of the grouping’s total trade, so there’s plenty of potential for diversion.
– Some member states — Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey — are heavily engaged in the global economy, and they would certainly suffer some trade diversion.
– Member states might lose interest in the WTO negotiations. The Doha Round can’t afford to lose any of it already paltry momentum.

Why this agreement isn’t a serious threat to multilateral trade liberalization –

– A number of the Islamic participants — Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia — aren’t WTO members. This is an alternative mechanism for international trade cooperation.
– It’s a non-hegemonic agreement – these countries aren’t determining whether the WTO talks go well or not. The EU and US will make or break the Doha round.
– The potential for trade creation likely outweighs the risk of trade diversion, as most of these economies aren’t heavily engaged in international commerce.

Why this agreement is even being proposed –

– The US has been neglecting Muslim countries in pursuing its “competitive liberalization” trade negotiation strategy.

A Strange Definition of “Developed”

Hindu Business Line: “Low tax-GDP ratio daunts India’s quest to join developed world”

India is keen on joining the league of developed countries by 2020 as per the stated objective of the Government a couple of years ago. But with targets of the gross tax/GDP ratio (combined Centre and States) not reaching the 17 per cent the country had in the past, the latest picture from OECD on the tax front highlights the Herculean task ahead for the Indian tax authorities to push up the ratio.

Agricultural subsidies aren’t key to food security

Baron Coleman defends agricultural subsidies on national security grounds:

In theory, opening America’s agricultural markets makes sense… Free competition would dictate the price of goods, which likely wouldn’t change much for the average American consumer. If that was the end of the analysis, I would be on board.

But it isn’t.

The implications of being dependent on “foreign food” – much like the US has become dependent on “foreign oil” – would eventually become disastrous. America’s food supply would quickly become dependent on the stability of the politics and climates of developing countries.

That’s a risk I’m not willing to take. [The Baron]

There is no need for agricultural subsidies, even if one is afraid of dependence upon foreign producers.

First, the United States is a dominant agricultural producer. According to the USDA, “the United States is the largest exporter of agricultural products in the world and is a highly competitive producer of many products.” The US’s strengths vary. For example, the US is a net exporter of rice & wheat and a net importer of macaroni & pastries. The Midwest heartland was the “breadbasket of America” long before agricultural subsidies.

Second, Baron’s analysis doesn’t assess the marginal impact of subsidies. The removal of subsidies would not wipe out all American agricultural producers; rather, marginal producers whose operations were only profitable due to the receipt of subsidies would exit the market. [This reduction in domestic producers would be somewhat offset by the entry of new producers from other countries to the degree that there was a global price increase.] The allocation of agricultural production globally would better reflect comparative advantage (subject to the constraint of other nations protecting and subsidizing their own agricultural markets). The US would still produce a lot of food.

Third, specialization through international trade does not permanently erode the supply capacity of output sectors that are at a comparative disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign competitors. Just as reductions in the foreign supply of oil raise the global price and induce new investments in drilling for oil in the United States, global price increases spurred by reduced agricultural production abroad would result in increased domestic production of agricultural goods in the US.

[There might be dynamic concerns. For examples, if factories or IT parks were erected on every piece of arable land in the United States, it would take time to transform those assets into production inputs for agricultural firms. If someone wants to develop this structural friction into a scenario for a temporary food shortage, I may or may not refute that story.]

Fourth, oil “dependence” has served us fairly well. While we could have adopted “oil security” by only using American oil, we’d have had to pay much higher prices at the pump. We’ve reaped gains from trade by allowing US entities to purchase oil from foreigners. When people complain about events or factors that increase the price of oil by reducing the certainty of being able to obtain imports, they are complaining about the loss of gains from trade, not harm that makes us worse off than if we had never traded. [Recall Brad DeLong’s more general formulation of this argument in regards to international trade.]

Any harm due to our “dependence upon foreign oil” has been due to the efforts of US policymakers to “secure” access to foreign oil through a military presence in the Persian Gulf or other policies. The country can’t be hurt by being willing to import foreign goods (unless the income is used by foreigners to engage in damaging non-economic activities like terrorism).

Fifth, markets compensate for uncertainty. When there are fears that an oil-exporting regime may collapse or cease exporting, the perceived probability of that risk is incorporated into the present price of oil, raising it (because the potential of reduced supply increases the expected future price of oil, which is equal to the current price of oil).

Food futures won’t operate quite as smoothly, to the degree that food commodities have storage costs. But if the expected price of food for next year’s harvest is higher due to the potential that some foreign producers won’t be able to reach the market (due to political uncertainty, etc), then more investments in food production will usually be made. If the damaging event doesn’t happen, then there’s an oversupply and some of those investments lose money. If it does occur, then the price is higher and those investments pay off. If it’s true that there are significant risks attached to “dependence on foreign food,” then we shouldn’t expect domestic production to disappear.

The bottom line: In the absence of agricultural subsidies, United States farmers would continue to produce massive amount of food, and the US would likely remain a net exporter of agricultural commodities. But even in a world where the US produced very little food domestically, the situation would more closely resemble our dependence on foreign textiles than our dependence on foreign oil. And I’m not worried about China leaving me naked.

Japan Won’t Move

Japan has rejected American proposals to re-start the stalled Doha Round of global trade talks, describing them as “not acceptable.” Agriculture Minister Mineichi Iwanaga says Japan and other countries will now offer an alternative plan later this week. [Radio Australia]

I’m not surprised.

How not to run a welfare state: India

Andy Mukherjee argues that the Indian government is squabbling liberalization opportunities by managing the welfare state poorly:

The architects of India’s rural job-guarantee program forgot to ask themselves a crucial question: Instead of paying one group of villagers to dig holes, and another to fill them, wouldn’t it be cheaper to just give people the money and have them stay home? …

The nature of the actual work to be done is so incidental to the program that it found a mention only in the appendix of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act published last month. Why not dump the charade of job guarantees and just give people the cash? …

An elaborate job guarantee program that requires synchronized efforts by five levels of government across five different ministries and a plethora of coordinators is like a machine with too many moving parts: It’s bound to fail…

By contrast, a cash grant, which covers both rural and urban India, could have been used as a bargaining chip for the Indian government to mobilize political support for doing away with subsidies on food, fertilizer and fuel, which together cost $10 billion last year. [IHT]

Breakthrough on Subsidies?

In an effort to revive stalled World Trade Organization (WTO) talks, US Trade Representative Rob Portman said the US would cut farm subsidies by 60%. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson responded by saying that the EU “will match, and indeed go substantially beyond” that reduction… Europe’s response came after the US said its offer was valid only if the EU and Japan also made large cuts in trade-distorting support for agriculture. [BBC]

Will Japan move to match?

(On an almost unrelated note, the BBC story features an old photo of anti-WTO protestors in turle costumes. Recall, as Jagdish Bhagwati has noted, that those activists didn’t understand the shrimp/turtle decision and that the WTO actually ruled in favor of the environmental protection.)