Quick links

The WTO Public Forum is this week, and they’re live-tweeting it.

Ryan Avent still believes what he believes about renminbi revaluation. Fred Bergsten still believes what he believes about it. But then he springs the suggestion of “countervailing currency intervention”, in which the US government would sell dollars and buy renminbi – check it out at 7:05 of the video.

Dani Rodrik says that Chinese undervaluation hurts growth prospects in other poor countries.

Google wants to influence trade negotiations

USTR Ron Kirk visited Google last week for a round table on “Supporting Silicon Valley in the Global Economy.” One of the big headlines coming out of event is an argument, pushed by Google, that online censorship is a trade barrier.

The analogy/conflation between web openness and trade openness seems increasingly prevalent. The Economist devoted a cover story to the internet’s openness earlier this month and said that “the internet is as much a trade pact as an invention… Just as a free-trade agreement between countries increases the size of the market and boosts gains from trade, so the internet led to greater gains from the exchange of data and allowed innovation to flourish.”

While at some level the analogy is appropriate because there are common lessons, such as the fact that specialization is limited by the size of the market, I doubt that it’s as valuable when discussing the nuts and bolts of such (informational or economic) exchanges or the policies that should be adopted. But Google is pushing it hard:

Chief Legal Officer David Drummond… said Google is seeing an “alarming increase” in governments around the world censoring the Web, and he called on the U.S. government to treat the issue much as it would if a foreign nation was blocking the trade of physical goods.

“If this was happening with physical trade, we’d all be saying this violates trade agreements,” he said…

Drummond said barriers take several forms, such as blocking access to Google’s YouTube video service or by imposing licensing requirements that stipulate the company must install servers within a country in order to create a “local presence”–a definition that subjects content on those servers to local laws.

This argument, as presented by the WSJ, isn’t consistent with WTO law. Trade barriers discriminate between domestically produced goods and imports produced abroad. To quote myself:

Banning the consumption of tradable goods and services isn’t a WTO violation per se; international trade law emphasizes non-discrimination in the treatment of foreign and domestic products. Consider Antigua’s online gambling case against the US at the WTO. The basis for its claims was not that the US was obliged to allow online gambling, but that if it allowed domestic online gambling (such as allowed by the Interstate Horseracing Act), it was obliged by its GATS commitments to also allow online gambling provided by foreign suppliers. Similarly, I suspect that censorship only constitutes a trade barrier if foreign sources of information are censored more heavily than domestic providers, i.e. a difference in national treatment.

In short, “free trade” doesn’t mean “everything goes” and local laws can’t govern consumption. Free trade means non-discrimination with respect to producers’ origins.

The more plausible line of argument is that trade agreements can be used as leverage in negotiating non-trade issues:

“In our view at Google it’s high time for us to start really sinking our teeth into this one,” said Drummond.

“We have great opportunities now with pending trade agreements to start putting some pressure on countries to recognize that Internet freedom not only is a core value — that we should be holding them to account from a human rights standpoint — but also that if you want to be part of the community of free trade, you are going to have to find a way to allow the Internet to be open.”

But making trade negotiations contingent on pledges against government censorship doesn’t mean that Chinese-style internet censorship constitutes a trade barrier in the traditional WTO sense.

What is “African growth”?

Lant Pritchett provides some numbers to underscore a classic argument:

Perhaps the best thing the developed world could do for the growth prospects of Africa is to stop talking about the growth prospects of Africa…

The growth rate of GDP per capita across 155 countries in the world from 2000-2005 (using data from the latest Human Development Report) was 2.2% per annum and the standard deviation of that growth rate was 3.8.

Among the 21 countries in Western Europe the average growth rate over this period was 3.5% and the standard deviation among countries in Western Europe was 1.5. Now that’s a pretty good aggregate, knowing that country X is in the group “Western Europe” shifts my priors a bit upward, European growth was better and reduces my uncertainty about its growth rate by a lot—I am pretty sure it didn’t have negative growth nor growth at 8%.

Now take the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 2000-2005 the average growth rate was 2.2%—exactly the global average—but the standard deviation among African countries was 6.1%—much higher than the global variance. This is a terrible aggregate. All knowing that country X is “African” has done for me is increase the variance—I am not sure whether it was growing very fast (as were Sierra Leone and Mozambique) or collapsing (as were Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire).

Hufbauer and Lawrence: “Let’s Make a Deal”

In Foreign Affairs, Gary Hufbauer and Robert Lawrence posit a deal that they think would make concluding Doha feasible:

Many observers blame the complexity involved in getting 153 WTO members to reach consensus on an agenda with dozens of issues, but in fact the matter is far simpler. If China and the United States produced the sort of new offers described below, the momentum for a speedy agreement would be unstoppable.

Yet it appears that political considerations will prevent this from happening. US President Barack Obama pushed trade policy to the back burner while he concentrated on health care and financial reform. He needed nearly unanimous support from Democrats in Congress to enact his domestic agenda; trade agreements, meanwhile, are risky for Democratic politicians because many depend on unions, which wrongly believe that free trade means lost jobs. To counter such arguments, the Obama administration must demonstrate that trade agreements would boost US employment by doubling exports. The White House also needs strong support from Republicans, who tend to be allied with business. So far, US firms are lukewarm about the Doha Round because it seems to offer little from the large emerging economies, especially China…

These proposals could make the Doha Round a political winner: Major concessions by China and a few other emerging countries would be seen in the United States as evidence of greater access in markets that count. And China would advance its status as a full participant in the world trading system, while also positioning itself as the leader that delivered the benefits of the Doha agenda to all developing countries. The world would recover that much faster from the hangover of the Great Recession.

They want China to join the Government Procurement Agreement and liberalize services in exchange for the US recognizing China as a market economy and ending its annual compliance reviews. They also suggest that the US should end its cotton subsidies and ethanol tariffs. I doubt we’ll see these suggestions implemented any time soon.

Disaster-driven trade liberalization

EU members are thinking about helping Pakistan’s economy by liberalizing tariffs on some of its imports:

The most realistic option, according to some diplomats, would be for the EU to identify a list of products beneficial to Pakistan and then unilaterally reduce the so-called “most-favoured nation” tariffs it charges trading partners. Depending on the products and the tariff reductions, such a move could result in €100m to €150m in additional annual exports for Pakistan, according to preliminary calculations.

One challenge in devising a list, say people familiar with the matter, would be to help Pakistani exporters without providing unintended benefits to their Chinese rivals.

It’d be nice to see “preferential” liberalization come via MFN tariff reductions.

[HT: Seb]

NAFTA trucking dispute “rumbles toward a dead end”

The long-running NAFTA trucking dispute remains deadlocked. After 15 years, the US continues to refuse to allow Mexican trucks on US roads, citing safety concerns as cover for political motives. Cato’s Dan Ikenson says that Mexico is right to retaliate with tariffs after winning at both the NAFTA dispute settlement panel (2001) and the US Supreme Court (2004) and yet seeing little-to-no progress. But Washington insiders say the issue won’t be resolved any time soon.

PTAs and the incidence of antidumping actions

Preferential trade agreements spur discriminatory anti-dumping practices:

“In this paper we empirically explore the possibility of additional discrimination via PTAs by focusing on the extent to which PTAs alter the pattern of antidumping (AD) activity… AD provisions in PTAs have decreased the number of intra-PTA AD cases by 33-55% and increased the number of AD actions against non-PTA members by 10-30%… PTAs without AD language do not experience any change in AD activity whereas PTAs with AD rules are characterized by protection reduction and protection diversion.”

Just as it’s difficult to assess the net benefits of trade creation minus trade diversion, it’s likely tough to discern the net benefit of PTAs’ AD clauses in terms of protection reduction minus protection diversion.

Betting on shipping

The Economist has a story on container derivatives:

Some 140m containers now carry around half of the world’s exports by value. And according to the brokers that are starting to offer container-freight derivatives, contracts based on the future price of renting containers, the way these boxes are financed is about to undergo another revolution.

[HT: Seb]