Author Archives: jdingel

Trade and inequality — two reasons not to blame trade

Robert Z. Lawrence says that trade and inequality aren’t linked à la the conventional wisdom:

Not only have imports from developing countries increased dramatically, but the relative prices of manufactured goods from these countries have declined steadily since the early 90s. Yet the big surprise is that over the past fifteen years wages of the least skilled Americans – the lowest 10 percent – have kept pace with the median. Moreover, since 1999, while real wage growth in general has been sluggish, most US relative wage and compensation measures indicate little evidence of increased inequality…

At relatively high levels of aggregation the data indicate that manufactured imports overall, and even those from developing countries such as China, are concentrated in US manufacturing sectors which pay significantly higher than average US wages. This means that import displacement does not fall disproportionately on less skilled workers…

At more disaggregated levels, however, the data suggests that goods imported from developing countries such as China are associated with relatively less skilled labor inputs and – judging by their unit values – qualitatively different from those produced by developed countries such as the US. This provides support for the view that much of this trade reflects more complete specialisation and as such does not result in either wage inequality or downward pressure on wages generally.

It will take more research to quantify the relative magnitudes of these two effects. Nonetheless, it does appear that over the past decade, US income inequality has continued to grow but not in a way that suggests trade with developing countries is the major reason. It’s not the least skilled who have fallen behind but profits and the wages of the very richest Americans that have raced ahead.

The Secret Trade Deal of 2007

From Trade Observatory comes a wacky piece by David Sirota:

As Congress reconvenes this week, K Street and a handful of Democratic congressional leaders are gearing up to pass lobbyist-written trade pacts with Peru, Panama, South Korea and Columbia – the group of pacts known as The Secret Trade Deal of 2007, originally announced on May 10, 2007.

First, if they’re known as “The Secret Trade Deal” and publicly announced, then they’re not much of a secret, huh? Second, since when was a column summarizing AP, Inside US Trade, and Reuters stories revealing any secrets? Third, are they really “known” as The Secret Trade Deal of 2007 if the inventor of the phrase is the only person who uses it?

If David Sirota is “a progressive powerhouse,” then progressives ought to worry about their ability to debate trade issues. Trade Observatory should start syndicating Dean Baker instead.

Trade and inequality — in developing countries

From the NBER Digest:

While trade liberalization was expected to help the less skilled, who are presumed to be the relatively abundant factor in developing countries, there is overwhelming evidence that they are generally not made better off relative to workers with higher skill or education levels.

One of the few uncontroversial insights of trade theory is that changes in a country’s exposure to international trade, and to world markets more generally, affect the distribution of incomes within the country. Not surprisingly, the entry of many developing countries into the world market in the last three decades coincides with changes in various measures of inequality in these countries. What is more surprising is that the distributional changes went in the opposite direction from what the conventional wisdom suggests: while trade liberalization was expected to help the less skilled, who are presumed to be the relatively abundant factor in developing countries, there is overwhelming evidence that they are generally not made better off relative to workers with higher skill or education levels.

In Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries (NBER Working Paper No. 12885), authors Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik attempt to explain this paradox. They question whether the underlying conventional wisdom is too stylized to capture the reality of the developing world and they ask whether other forces at work may have overridden the effects of globalization. They also examine the mechanisms through which globalization has affected inequality and try to determine whether general lessons can be drawn from the experience of the last three decades.

The authors’ findings suggest a contemporaneous increase in various measures of globalization and inequality in most developing countries, although establishing a causal link between these two trends has proven more challenging. However, the evidence has provided little support for the conventional wisdom that trade openness in developing countries would favor the less fortunate.

The authors also find little support for the premise that adjustment to changing economic conditions would occur through labor reallocation from declining to growing sectors of the economy, at least at the aggregate industry level usually considered in traditional international trade models of comparative advantage. A common finding of studies of the effects of trade reforms in developing countries is the lack (or small magnitude) of sectoral labor reallocation. In some instances, the data also suggest that the wage response to trade barrier reductions is more pronounced than the employment response.

The cumulative evidence points to constrained labor mobility as one plausible explanation for the lack of sectoral reallocation. Indeed, the strict labor market regulation that many developing countries had in place prior to the recent reforms is a potential source of labor market rigidities. The importance of these rigidities is likely to diminish in the long run, especially since many developing countries have by now significantly liberalized their labor markets.

The authors’ findings highlight several globalization-based explanations for the increased relative demand for more educated workers within industries. In some cases, trade reforms that liberalized, in addition to goods flows, factor flows (most importantly capital) may have generated additional demand for skilled workers. In other instances, globalization affected not only trade in final goods, but also trade in intermediate goods that, from the developing country perspective, were skill-intensive. Even in those cases where liberalization was concentrated on final goods, the highest trade barrier reductions often were concentrated – contrary to conventional wisdom – on low-skill sectors that originally had enjoyed a higher level of protection. Technological change that favored skilled workers may have interacted with trade reforms to further depress the relative demand for low-skilled workers. Increased exposure to currency fluctuations boosted exports from developing count! ries in some cases and provided incentives to upgrade the product-mix of their domestic plants. These compositional changes may have fostered a quality upgrading of plants that further contributed to the widening of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled.

Overall, it appears that the particular mechanisms through which globalization affected inequality are country-, time- and case-specific; that the effects of trade liberalization need to be examined in conjunction with other concurrent policy reforms; and that implementation details of particular policies matter. This conclusion may seem disappointing, according to the authors, as it offers no simple predictions regarding the distributional impact of globalization and hence no straightforward recipe for remedial measures to alleviate potentially adverse impacts. Yet, it is hardly surprising given the heterogeneity of countries, reforms, and overall globalization experience within the developing world.

Finally, the authors emphasize that most of the existing evidence refers to narrow measures of inequality such as the skill premium, or wage inequality. Broader concepts of inequality that focus on consumption and general well-being have received substantially less attention. The very scant evidence that exists on these issues, however, seems to suggest that the labor market effects of globalization dominate its effects on consumption through relative price changes, so perhaps the focus on wages alone is not as limiting as one would have thought.

NBER working paper 12885.

Sydney and Geneva: Don’t expect any break-throughs

Two seemingly important events in trade negotiations take place this week: an APEC summit and the resumption of Doha talks.

The FT says the Bush administration “will seek to breathe fresh life” into the Doha agenda, but their only evidence for that effort is an administration statement that it “is prepared to make the tough choices if others are likewise prepared to make those tough choices to create new trade flows.” That just means nothing new is happening.

The deputy US national security advisor for economic affairs also said that the US will push the creation of a Pacific region PTA – the so-called FTAAP – but that won’t happen. Given Congressional sentiments, how could Bush ever push a big trade deal that included China?

This week will be merely continue what the Bush administration has been doing for a few years on trade – lots of talk, little action.

Sydney and Geneva: Don't expect any break-throughs

Two seemingly important events in trade negotiations take place this week: an APEC summit and the resumption of Doha talks.

The FT says the Bush administration “will seek to breathe fresh life” into the Doha agenda, but their only evidence for that effort is an administration statement that it “is prepared to make the tough choices if others are likewise prepared to make those tough choices to create new trade flows.” That just means nothing new is happening.

The deputy US national security advisor for economic affairs also said that the US will push the creation of a Pacific region PTA – the so-called FTAAP – but that won’t happen. Given Congressional sentiments, how could Bush ever push a big trade deal that included China?

This week will be merely continue what the Bush administration has been doing for a few years on trade – lots of talk, little action.

Sydney and Geneva: Don't expect any break-throughs

Two seemingly important events in trade negotiations take place this week: an APEC summit and the resumption of Doha talks.

The FT says the Bush administration “will seek to breathe fresh life” into the Doha agenda, but their only evidence for that effort is an administration statement that it “is prepared to make the tough choices if others are likewise prepared to make those tough choices to create new trade flows.” That just means nothing new is happening.

The deputy US national security advisor for economic affairs also said that the US will push the creation of a Pacific region PTA – the so-called FTAAP – but that won’t happen. Given Congressional sentiments, how could Bush ever push a big trade deal that included China?

This week will be merely continue what the Bush administration has been doing for a few years on trade – lots of talk, little action.

Competitiveness, a continuing series

‘Competitiveness’ rears its ugly head by Samuel Brittan, FT:

“Competitiveness” originally had a clear meaning but has now been taken up by politicians and business leaders as an all-purpose slogan… Unfortunately this debatable concept is now too generally accepted in the political world for such repudiation to be feasible. Originally some economists and officials mentally substituted the word “performance”, but now themselves talk of competitiveness, presumably thinking: if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em… What is misleading is the transfer to whole economies of concepts relevant to individual businesses or regions…

Here we come to the rub of the matter. The competitiveness analysis applies where there is a single currency. If we still had the mark and the lira we could leave the foreign exchange market to sort it out. The exchange rate is a safety valve which allows a country employing it to make up its own mind on its inflation goals and level of business support without worrying about the balance of payments.

The vogue for competitiveness arose in a fixed exchange world. Then if UK products were too expensive, or in other ways unattractive, jobs would be cut and foreign exchange reserves might be lost by the British government, which would then have to embark on one of its notorious stop-go episodes. Edward Heath’s decision in 1972 to float sterling, however reluctantly he made it, should have changed all that. Yet even the British Treasury found it difficult to adapt.

Previous installments:
Competitiveness, argh!” (11 Aug 2007)
Competitiveness, again (29 May 2007)
Obsession with “competitiveness” lives on (30 Aug 2006)
Paul Krugman – Pop Internationalism (29 Aug 2006)

Fifth Avenue farms

Behold the power of Google Maps:

“The red dots indicate people who live in Manhattan (and so clearly are neither hurting for money nor tilling the soil on the family farm) but receive agricultural subsidies from the federal government. The larger red blobs mark people receiving more than a quarter of a million dollars in farm subsidies annually.” – Yuval Levin

[HT: Norberg]