Author Archives: jdingel

Adam Smith and capital’s home bias

Ian Ayres and Doug Kysar, law profs at Yale, apply The Theory of Moral Sentiments to carbon trading. They include this paragraph:

In addition to his famous arguments in favor of markets and liberalized trade, Smith also had a well-worked-out theory of moral behavior, one that was not so neatly separated from his economic thought as we treat it today. For example, Smith’s arguments in favor of free trade included an assumption that owners of capital would naturally prefer domestic to foreign industry, even if the latter offered higher returns. Smith thought this was a good thing because it reflected the moral sentiments that ultimately help make markets work.

What? Citation, please.

I can find no such suggestion in chapter seven of Doug Irwin’s Against the Tide, “Adam Smith’s Case for Free Trade.” I do find this quotation, which seems at odds with Ayres and Kysar’s suggestion:

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find to the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.” [Irwin p.76; Smith IV.ii.4]

Moreover, how does not pursuing the profit-maximising returns in allocating productive resources across industries or countries “help make markets work”? Smith wrote:

The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. [Irwin, p.79; Smith IV.ii.12]

If Ayres and Kysar are right about Smith, then I’d like to learn how capital’s home bias provides a public good necessary to the system of natural liberty or otherwise enhances simple-minded profit-seeking in the market. Synthesizing such a bias with Smith’s more familiar work quoted above doesn’t strike me as obvious.

Adam Smith and capital's home bias

Ian Ayres and Doug Kysar, law profs at Yale, apply The Theory of Moral Sentiments to carbon trading. They include this paragraph:

In addition to his famous arguments in favor of markets and liberalized trade, Smith also had a well-worked-out theory of moral behavior, one that was not so neatly separated from his economic thought as we treat it today. For example, Smith’s arguments in favor of free trade included an assumption that owners of capital would naturally prefer domestic to foreign industry, even if the latter offered higher returns. Smith thought this was a good thing because it reflected the moral sentiments that ultimately help make markets work.

What? Citation, please.

I can find no such suggestion in chapter seven of Doug Irwin’s Against the Tide, “Adam Smith’s Case for Free Trade.” I do find this quotation, which seems at odds with Ayres and Kysar’s suggestion:

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find to the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.” [Irwin p.76; Smith IV.ii.4]

Moreover, how does not pursuing the profit-maximising returns in allocating productive resources across industries or countries “help make markets work”? Smith wrote:

The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. [Irwin, p.79; Smith IV.ii.12]

If Ayres and Kysar are right about Smith, then I’d like to learn how capital’s home bias provides a public good necessary to the system of natural liberty or otherwise enhances simple-minded profit-seeking in the market. Synthesizing such a bias with Smith’s more familiar work quoted above doesn’t strike me as obvious.

Adam Smith and capital's home bias

Ian Ayres and Doug Kysar, law profs at Yale, apply The Theory of Moral Sentiments to carbon trading. They include this paragraph:

In addition to his famous arguments in favor of markets and liberalized trade, Smith also had a well-worked-out theory of moral behavior, one that was not so neatly separated from his economic thought as we treat it today. For example, Smith’s arguments in favor of free trade included an assumption that owners of capital would naturally prefer domestic to foreign industry, even if the latter offered higher returns. Smith thought this was a good thing because it reflected the moral sentiments that ultimately help make markets work.

What? Citation, please.

I can find no such suggestion in chapter seven of Doug Irwin’s Against the Tide, “Adam Smith’s Case for Free Trade.” I do find this quotation, which seems at odds with Ayres and Kysar’s suggestion:

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find to the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.” [Irwin p.76; Smith IV.ii.4]

Moreover, how does not pursuing the profit-maximising returns in allocating productive resources across industries or countries “help make markets work”? Smith wrote:

The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. [Irwin, p.79; Smith IV.ii.12]

If Ayres and Kysar are right about Smith, then I’d like to learn how capital’s home bias provides a public good necessary to the system of natural liberty or otherwise enhances simple-minded profit-seeking in the market. Synthesizing such a bias with Smith’s more familiar work quoted above doesn’t strike me as obvious.

Bailout plans cover foreign banks

This news is more than 36 hours old, which is ancient history as the biggest bailout ever unfolds at lightning speed:

In a change from the original proposal sent to Capitol Hill, foreign-based banks with big U.S. operations could qualify for the Treasury Department’s mortgage bailout, according to the fine print of an administration statement Saturday night.

The theory, according to a participant in the negotiations, is that if the goal is to solve a liquidity crisis, it makes no sense to exclude banks that do a lot of lending in the United States.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson confirmed the change on ABC’s “This Week,” telling George Stephanopoulos that coverage of foreign-based banks is “a distinction without a difference to the American people.”

Eichengreen: Dollar is headed down

Barry Eichengreen agrees with Ken Rogoff:

The dollar’s strength reflects the knee-jerk reaction of investors rushing into US treasuries as a safe haven. It is worth remembering that the same thing happened in August 2007, when the sub-prime crisis erupted. But once investors realized the extent of US financial problems, the rush into treasuries subsided, and the dollar resumed its decline. Now, as investors recall the extent of US financial problems, we will again see the dollar resume its decline.

Hat tip to Thoma.

Who saw the Doha collapse coming?

Benjamin Cohen asks:

By ignoring the role of politics, economists often get it wrong. How many trade specialists were prepared for the recent breakdown of the Doha trade talks, despite the obvious gains to be had on all sides from a new round of liberalisation?

The answer is almost everyone (Jagdish Bhagwati’s strategic optimism notwithstanding). Trade specialists are (sadly) well aware of the political constraints that shape trade policy.