Author Archives: jdingel

English cloth and Portuguese wine

David Ricardo:

Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole… It is this principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England…

If Portugal had no commercial connexion with other countries, instead of employing a great part of her capital and industry in the production of wines, with which she purchases for her own use the cloth and hardware of other countries, she would be obliged to devote a part of that capital to the manufacture of those commodities, which she would thus obtain probably inferior in quality as well as quantity.

The quantity of wine which she shall give in exchange for the cloth of England, is not determined by the respective quantities of labour devoted to the production of each, as it would be, if both commodities were manufactured in England, or both in Portugal.

England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same time. England would therefore find it her interest to import wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth.

John Nye:

Prior to the late 1600s, the British drank plenty of wine, mostly French, a little Spanish, but virtually nothing from Portugal. The wars of 1689-1713 gave the Portuguese allies the opportunity of ten lifetimes. Beginning in 1703 a treaty was signed granting Portugal access to British markets for their wines—generally of a much lower quality than those of France, and often needing to be fortified with brandy or spirits in order to keep from going bad. The Methuen Treaty (as it was known) promised that Portuguese tariffs would always be at least a third lower than those of other nations, most especially France.

Of course, most of the Portuguese wine trade was dominated by British ships, merchants, and even vintners working in Iberia. The end of hostilities between Britain and France was seen as a grave threat to all these British interests, and vigorous lobbying by brewers, distillers, and the Anglo-Portuguese merchants stopped attempts to return to the period of open trade with the French.

Trade theorists have learned their lesson: use Greek letters rather than real world examples!

Hat tip: EconTalk.

Trade (usually) has winners and losers

There’s a discussion of international trade at Martin Wolf’s forum.

Larry Summers writes:

The normal argument is that a more rapidly growing global economy benefits workers and companies in an individual country by expanding the market for exports. This is a valid consideration. But it is also true that the success of other countries, and greater global integration, places more competitive pressure on an individual economy. Workers are likely disproportionately to bear the brunt of this pressure.

Lawrence Marsh writes:

We all seem to have forgotten basic economics in general and international trade theory in particular. What happen to the issue of the efficient allocation of resources? Since when do tariffs, trade restrictions and other methods of distorting prices help increase the welfare of society?

Free trade brings in more competition forcing businesses to improve their productivity and efficiency and to lower prices…

Since everyone is a consumer, everyone benefits from lower prices.

Tim Worstall attempts a summary:

I should of course approach the debates amongst those greatly better versed than I in the subject under discussion, the economics of trade and globalisation, with a certain humility… So, without that necessary timidity, here goes…

They’re talking past each other. Summers is putting the American political case for the support of further globalisation. Within the limits of American politics he may well be correct. Marsh is making a very different case: not having been in the political system (Summers was Treasury Secretary under Clinton), only the academic, his view of the matter is more straightforward. We’re economists and this is what economics has to say about trade. As far as I’m aware, what he says is correct too.

Not quite. Why would Larry Summers write a column that merely capitulated to protectionist sentiments contrary to economic insight?

They’re talking past each other because they have different models of international trade in mind. Larry Summers is alluding to a Heckscher-Ohlin-Viner type of model with multiple factor inputs, while Marsh’s story about price competition looks more like an oligopolistic model of trade.

In Summers’ world, the claim that “since everyone is a consumer, everyone benefits from lower prices” is flat out wrong — trade changes relative prices, and in the n &times n HOV model, Stolper-Samuelson holds for at least one factor!

What does Marsh have in mind? In a basic model of oligopolistic competition, à la Brander (1981), there is only one factor of production, so distributional concerns (other than firms vs consumers) don’t apply. Moreover, it’s partial equilibrium, so you can’t really say much about welfare. If Marsh’s story relies on an oligopolistic general equilibrium model of trade, then it’s a long way from “basic economics.”

Most trade produces winners and losers. Not always, but that’s how Paul Krugman would summarize econ 101. That’s why most economists will back Larry Summers over Lawrence Marsh. Sorry, Tim.

[Of course, there can be stories without losers: Krugman (1979) features monopolistic competition, so that moving from trade to autarky simply doubles the size of the economy, leaving all firms the same and improving consumer welfare via gains from variety.]

The 2008 farm bill offends both free traders and protectionists

R. Dennis Olson at IATP really confuses me with this column:

The 2008 Farm Bill to be voted on by the House and Senate this week includes incremental gains for conservation, renewable energy, food aid and healthier, local food systems. However, it fails to reverse decades of deregulation that have increased agricultural market volatility to the benefit of global food corporations, and at the expense of farmers, consumers, rural communities and the environment…

These same global food corporations saw increased profits when farm prices collapsed by 40 percent after the market deregulation of the 1996 Farm Bill, and they are making even more money now that food prices have risen to crisis levels. Market deregulation in effect privatizes crucial market information, which suppresses price transparency and price discovery. This, in turn, increases the ability of big firms to manipulate prices.

I’m sorry, but what aspect of federal agricultural subsidies preclude collusive pricing? And shouldn’t the 2002 farm bill’s subsidy increases have addressed that problem? And do agro-giants really earn profits based on price volatility, making money hand over fist whether the price is low or high? What do you want the farm bill to do? Further insulate agriculture from market forces?

On the positive side of the ledger…

the Farm Bill extends the sugar program at a crucial time when it is under siege from the final phase-in of deregulation mandated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It contains a new program that would use the growing sugar surpluses created by NAFTA and other free trade agreements to supplement corn ethanol production…

We fear that the deregulation of the North American sweetener market will result in the destruction of the U.S. and Mexican sugar industries…

Oh dear, it’s becoming clear now.

Chinese trade and pollution

You can’t blame trade for Chinese pollution, report Judith Dean and Mary Lovely over at Vox:

In a recent working paper, “Trade Growth, Production Fragmentation and China’s Environment,” we calculate and track the pollution content of China’s export and import bundles from 1995 to 2005… We find that as China’s trade has grown, the pollution intensity of almost all sectors has fallen in terms of water pollution (measured by chemical oxygen demand (COD)) and air pollution (measured by SO2, smoke or dust) in 2004…

Our study also reveals that China’s major exporting industries are not highly polluting, and that the export bundle is shifting toward relatively cleaner sectors over time. In 1995, textiles and apparel accounted for the largest shares of Chinese exports to the world, but these shares fell by about a third over the following decade. Office and computing machinery and communications equipment, in contrast, were the fastest growing exports and accounted for the largest export share in 2005. What is striking is that these growing sectors are cleaner than textiles and apparel; indeed, they are among the cleanest manufacturing sectors by the available measures of air and water pollution. The most polluting sectors, such as paper and non-metallic minerals, have in fact very low and declining shares in China’s manufacturing exports.

Linking industrial pollution intensities to detailed trade statistics from China Customs, we find that, contrary to popular expectations, China’s exports are less water pollution intensive and generally less air pollution intensive than Chinese import-competing industries. Moreover, both Chinese exports and imports are becoming cleaner over time. Part of this trend reflects changes in the composition of the trade bundle, as noted above. However, our evidence suggests that most of the fall in the pollution content of China’s trade is due to changes in industrial pollution intensities (how China produces), rather than in trade patterns (what China exports and imports). This latter finding has important implications as it suggests that the downward trend is not dependent on relationships with particular trade partners…

Finally, we find some evidence that international production fragmentation, the breaking of production into distinct processes, may have played a role in reducing the pollution content of Chinese trade. “Processing trade” alone accounts for about 56% of the growth in China’s exports and 41% of the growth in China’s imports between 1995 and 2005. If investment in processing activities expands the range of the production process performed in China, this investment will tend to make China’s production and trade cleaner. Additionally, if the foreign-invested enterprises responsible for most of this trade bring greener technologies than those used by domestic producers, this will tend to make trade even cleaner. We find strong evidence that Chinese processing exports are cleaner than Chinese ordinary exports. Statistical testing suggests that processing trade has played a key role in explaining the drop in the pollution intensity of Chinese exports over time and that FDI inflows have contributed significantly to this decline, even controlling for the processing trade share.

Calling Larry Summers

Devesh Kapur, Pratap Mehta and Arvind Subramanian are unhappy:

Is a liberal international economic order losing intellectual support? Should developing economies be worried? If Larry Summers is the canary in the intellectual mine, his two columns in the Financial Times (April 28 and May 5) suggest that the answers to both questions are yes.

The liberal economic order of the last several decades was premised on two assumptions. First, that the proliferation of prosperity across countries was a good thing. Second, there would be winners and losers but, on balance, a majority of people in both developing and developed countries would benefit. Mr Summers now appears to be questioning both assumptions. He has not stated outright that the proliferation of prosperity is undesirable but his ­columns do suggest that globalisation creates competition for America…

In doing so he, perhaps unwittingly, presents the rise of the poorer parts of the world (whose standards of living are still a fraction of US levels) more as a threat than an opportunity to the US. In effect, globalisation is justified only when it serves American interests.

This apparently nationalist argument is couched in appealing distributional terms…

The problem Mr Summers identifies, the hyper-mobility of capital, was an outcome that he and the US actively promoted… At the US Treasury, Mr Summers was a leading proponent of capital account liberalisation by developing countries. Having swallowed those bitter pills of intellectual property protection and capital mobility as a necessary price for a better future, developing countries are now told that those medicines cause problems that need more – in this case protectionist – medication…

One reading is that Mr Summers’ angst about globalisation is motivated by desire to maintain the environment for the continuing spread of prosperity: a need to tweak the rules – through regulatory harmonisation – to bolster the fraying consensus among the US middle class in favour of globalisation.

But the manner in which his position is framed, the inconsistencies of the arguments across time, the inappropriate transferring of the burden of any response from domestic actions to international ones, and the susceptibility of the proposed remedies to protectionist misuse point to a more alarming prospect for developing countries. The ground is shifting under their feet. They would do well to take notice.

More Doha trouble: Movement of natural persons

Emmanuel:

It is ironic how Mode 4 has backfired on the US and to some extent the EU. Mode 4 was once seen as a way to extend the dominance of Western firms in service arenas. Now that LDCs are progressing smartly in services provision themselves, Mode 4 has become a “non-trade” issue according to the West. If Mode 4 speaks so little about trade, then why was it included in the GATS in the first place?