“There is no evidence [trade finance] is a real bottleneck to trade.” – Simeon Djankov
OECD: Trade to drop 13%
The OECD sees the WTO’s 9% and raises it to a 13% drop in global trade in 2009. I haven’t had a chance to look at the analysis and identify the forces causing their predictions to differ.
The WTO as an institutional backstop against protectionism
What’s keeping protectionism in check? Chris Giles and Alan Beattie in the FT:
Leaders of the Group of 20 nations will on Thursday pledge to promote trade as a crucial driver of economic growth, to avoid protectionist measures and to strive for a rapid completion of the Doha round of trade negotiations.
But behind these fine intentions lies the debris of similarly grand past promises and a record of creeping protectionism since the start of the year…
the WTO itself, along with independent trade experts, says that the rise in protectionist actions over the past few months has not been particularly dramatic, largely involving the reversal of cuts in tariffs taken during the commodity price boom of 2007-8.
But it appears to be the existence of binding legal agreements, either under the WTO or bilateral or regional pacts, that have constrained governments, rather than the G20 pledge…
In an attempt to hold governments to their no protectionism pledge, the WTO has begun publishing a document, previously compiled for internal use, which lists actions taken both to loosen and tighten restrictions on trade.
The publication has been controversial within the WTO. Korea and Ecuador both asked for changes to be made after the first version was circulated in January, saying it did not accurately reflect their trade policy.
“I will go further in the direction of name and shame, but I have to go carefully,” Mr Lamy says. “We have to raise the temperature bit by bit.”
Congressional representatives who don't understand international economics
Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann is clueless about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. In fact, it seems she’s clueless about what a reserve currency is. That’s why, in reaction to China’s SDR proposal, she’s introducing legislation to “bar the dollar from being replaced by any foreign currency.” And apparently a lot of people are similarly confused and need a quick explanation of the difference between legal tender and currency reserves.
If Rep. Bachmann’s office needs some assistance with international economics, I’d be happy to provide some advice over the phone at a reasonable price.
A crisis round at the WTO?
Well, Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian’s call for a crisis round of WTO negotiations is more plausible than their previous call for a massive expansion of the WTO agenda.
Last-minute advice for the G20 summit?
I’m seeing a flurry of last-minute publications telling the G20 leaders what they should do on Thursday. Isn’t publishing a new report just five days before the summit a little late to shape the agenda? Presumably bureaucrats do a lot of background work, and the real achievements are made during the preparation for the summit rather than the single day itself.
The ridiculous inefficiency of migration barriers
Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett (2008). “The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border.” Center for Global Development Working Paper 148.
Are your wages determined by what you know, or where you live? This paper compares the wages of workers inside the United States to the wages of workers outside the United States. Comparing wages alone isn’t enough, because workers in (say) Bolivia could differ from workers in the U.S. in many ways—some of them easily observed, such as their level of education, and others less easily observed.
A rich new dataset on over two million workers around the world allows the analysis to control for several observable factors besides location that might affect wages, notably including country of birth and country of education. But just because a Bolivian in the U.S. is identical to a Bolivian in Bolivia by these observable measures, these two workers may not be identical in all ways: one of them was willing to move and incur the various costs of doing so, and one of them might differ from the other in unseen ways, such as risk-tolerance or entrepreneurial spirit. The paper uses several independent methods to estimate how such differences might bias its estimates, including new data on who what kinds of people choose to emigrate from nine different developing countries.
Following all of these adjustments the paper estimates that the wages of a Peruvian worker willing to work in the United States are about 2.6 times as much as the same person would make in Peru. This figure for Peru is typical among the 42 developing countries analyzed, but for some it is much higher. For Filipino it is around 3.5, and for a Haitian it is over 7. In other words, a Nigerian moderately-educated adult male urban formal-sector wage worker who moves to the U.S. increases his wages by several hundred percent.
The implications of these enormous differences are profound: (1) these gaps represent one of the largest remaining price distortions in any global market; (2) for many countries, the wage gaps caused by barriers to movement across international borders are among the largest known forms of wage discrimination, typically much larger than wage discrimination based on ethnic group or gender within spatially integrated labor markets; and (3) these gaps imply that simply allowing labor mobility can reduce a given household’s poverty to a much greater degree than most known antipoverty interventions inside developing countries.
30 years of World Development Reports
Here’s an interesting book description:
Since 1978, the World Bank’s annual World Development Report (WDR) has provided in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on a specific and important aspect of international development from agriculture, the role of the state, economic growth, and labor to infrastructure, health, the environment, and poverty. In the process, it has become a highly influential publication that is consulted by international organizations, national governments, scholars, and civil society networks to inform their decision-making processes. In this essay, Shahid Yusuf examines the last 30 years of development economics, viewed through the WDRs. The essay begins with a brief background on the circumstances of newly independent developing countries and summarizes some of the main strands of the emerging field of development economics. It then provides a sweeping examination of the coverage of the WDRs, reflecting on the key development themes synthesized by these reports and assessing how the research they present has contributed to policy making and development thought. The book then looks ahead and points to some of the big challenges that the World Bank may explore through future WDRs. The essay is followed by five commentaries, each written by a distinguished economist or development practitioner, which further explore this terrain from different perspectives. Together, the contents of this volume provide an extraordinary and remarkably compact tour of development economics through, around, and beyond the WDR. It will be invaluable to anyone interested in the evolution of development economics over the past three decades as well as for students, scholars, and policy makers in the field of development.
What would you be willing to pay for the text? Amazon.com would like $18.72. But, as far as I can tell, you can read the whole thing online in a beautiful viewer for free, courtesy of issuu. The commentators are Angus Deaton, Kemal Dervis, Bill Easterly, Takatoshi Ito, and Joe Stiglitz.
Trade openness and government size
This Vox column by Paolo Epifani and Gino Gancia on the relationship between trade openness and size of government is interesting because it both dismisses the received wisdom (of Dani Rodrik) and offers a new hypothesis:
More open countries have bigger governments…
Rodrik… argues that, in more open countries, firms and workers are more exposed to external risk and therefore demand more public insurance. Although plausible, this explanation fails to convince. In particular, if trade openness increases the demand for public insurance, this should show up in a surge of public transfers for social security and welfare. Our evidence shows however that, unlike government consumption, this kind of expenditure is uncorrelated with trade openness. Moreover, terms-of-trade volatility, which has been suggested as a measure of external risk, does not seem to (robustly) affect any kind of government expenditure…
We propose a different explanation. More open countries have larger public sectors because the cost of providing public goods is lower the higher a country’s involvement in foreign trade. The basic idea is that an expansion of the public sector crowds out private production, thereby reducing the domestic supply of exports. As long as the world demand for domestic products is downward sloping, a fall in domestic exports brings about a terms-of-trade improvement that partly compensate the increase in public expenditures. In other words, the rise in export prices shifts some of the costs of the public sector onto foreign consumers. This effect is stronger in more open economies, because the real-income effect of terms-of-trade movements is proportional to the volume of trade.
More Dead Aid
David Roodman isn’t happy with Dead Aid: “The book is sporadically footnoted, selective in its use of facts, sloppy, simplistic, illogical, and stunningly naive.”